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The purpose of this paper is to show that macroeconomic impacts might be very different depending
on what strategy developing countries will take.  In the first part, we investigate what macroeconomic
impacts an increased aversion to liquidity risk can have in a simple open economy model.  When the
government keeps foreign reserves constant, an increased aversion to liquidity risk reduces liquid debt
and increases illiquid debt.  However, its macroeconomic impacts are not large, causing only small
current account surpluses.  In contrast, when the government responds to the shock, the changed aversion
increases foreign reserves and may lead to a rise of liquidity debt.  In particular, under some reasonable
parameter set, it causes large macroeconomic impacts, including significant current account surpluses.
 In the second part, we provide several empirical supports to the implications.  In particular, we explore
how foreign debt maturity structures changed in East Asia.  We find that many East Asian economies
reduced short-term borrowings temporarily after the crisis but increased short-term borrowings in
the early 2000s.  We discuss that our results have important implications for the recent deterioration
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1. Introduction 
In recent literature, it has been widely discussed why the U.S. current account has deteriorated dramatically 
during the past decade (see, among others, Obstfeld and Rogoff [2004], Roubini and Setser [2004], Blanchard, 
Giavazzi, and Sa [2005]).  Although the U.S. current account had been in deficit for most of the periods in the 
1980s and the 1990s, its deficits had been almost balanced by Japan’s current account surpluses until the mid 
1990s.  However, the U.S. current account started to show a dramatic deterioration after 1997 and is now far 
from balanced by surpluses of the other industrialized countries (see Figure 1).  The first strand of studies 
proposes that the recent deterioration in the U.S. current account primarily reflects a decline of the U.S. domestic 
saving and an increase in the U.S. demand for foreign goods.  The second strand of studies, in contrast, points 
out that an increase in the global supply of saving, especially an increase in Asian and Middle Eastern savings, 
would help to explain the increase in the U.S. current account deficit.  In particular, these studies stress a 
remarkable reversal in global capital flows that has transformed emerging-market economies from borrowers to 
large net lenders in international capital markets (see, for example, Bernanke [2005], Dooley, Folkerts-Landau, 
and Garber [2005], and Caballero, Farhi, and Gourinchas  [2006]).    
When looking at the recent remarkable reversal in global capital flows, East Asian economies have been one of 
the major net lenders after the currency crisis in 1997.  Table 1 reports total trade balances of eight East Asian 
economies from 1990 to 2004.  It also reports their trade balances against the United States and the other trade 
partners.    It shows that except for Hong Kong and the Philippines, the East Asian economies had trade balance 
surpluses in total after the crisis.  In particular, except for the Philippines, they have had big trade balance 
surpluses against the United States since the crisis and the surpluses have widened in the 2000s.  The trade 
balance surpluses have been one of the main sources of the U.S. current account deficits since the late 1990s, 
especially since the early 2000s. 
In this paper, we explore some theoretical and empirical implications of the changed international capital flows 
in East Asian economies after the currency crisis.  During the crisis, East Asian economies with smaller liquid 
foreign assets had hard time in preventing panics in financial markets and sudden reversals in capital flows (see, 
for example, Corsetti, Pesenti, and Roubini [1999] and Sachs and Radelet [1998]).  Many developing countries 
thus came to recognize that increased liquidity is an important self-protection against crises.  Among the 
strategies for the self-protection, replacing liquid short-term debt by illiquid long-term debt was initially one 
popular advice that many economists suggested.  However, what most Asian economies have taken more 
seriously was raising foreign reserves (see, for example, Aizenman and Lee [2005] and Rodrik [2005]).    Foreign 
exchange reserves held by developing nations, especially East Asian economies, are now record-breaking, and 
stand at levels that are a multiple of those held by advanced countries.    The purpose of this paper is to show that 
macroeconomic impacts would be very different depending on which strategy developing countries will take for 
the self-protection. 
In the first part of this paper, we investigate what impacts an increased aversion to liquidity risk can have on 
current account and the other macroeconomic variables in a simple open economy model.  In the model, each 
representative agent maximizes the utility function over time.  Since Obstfeld and Rogoff (1997), usefulness of   3 
utility-based models has been widely recognized.   A key feature in our model is that relative size of net foreign 
liquid debt to foreign reserve reduces the utility.    This is one of the simplest forms that capture costs from holding 
liquid foreign debts.  At  period  τ, there is an unanticipated shock that increases aversion to liquidity risk.    When 
the government keeps the amount of foreign reserves constant, the increased aversion among private individuals 
reduces liquid debt and increases illiquid debt.  However, because the sum of liquid and illiquid debts does not 
change much, its macroeconomic impacts are not large, causing only small current account surpluses.  In 
contrast, when both private individuals and the government respond to an unanticipated increase of liquidity risk 
aversion, the increased aversion increases foreign reserves and may lead to a rise of liquid debt.  In particular, 
under some reasonable parameter set, it causes large macroeconomic impacts, including current account surpluses 
accompanied by depreciation of the real exchange rate. 
In the second part of the paper, we provide some empirical evidence in East Asia that supports to the theoretical 
implications.    In particular, we focus on the changes of foreign debt maturity structures and their implications in 
East Asian economies.  We find that many East Asian economies temporarily reduced short-term borrowings 
soon after the crisis but increased short-term borrowings in the early 2000’s.    Since short-term debt is liquid debt, 
the former change after the crisis is consistent with the case where only private agents responded to the increased 
aversion to liquidity risk.  However, the latter change is consistent with the case where the government also 
started to respond and accumulated substantial foreign exchange reserves.     
Since macroeconomic impacts of the increased liquidity risk aversion depend on which strategy the East Asian 
economies take, our results have several important implications.  In particular, accumulating foreign exchange 
reserves, the U.S. dollar is the dominant reserve currency in the currency compositions.  This suggests that 
substantial rises in foreign exchange reserves will increase capital inflows into the United States.  We point out 
that trade account surpluses have been widening against the United States but not against non-US countries in 
several Asian economies in the 2000s.  Finally, we find that there were substantial depreciations of East Asian 
real exchange rates against the U.S. dollar even after the economies recovered from the crisis.  We discuss that 
the result is also consistent with the model. 
  There are several previous studies that address determinants of debt maturity structure.  For example, Rodrik 
and Velasco (1999) argue that international investors with informational disadvantages may choose to lend 
short-term to better monitor and discipline borrowers (see also Fukuda [2001] and Jeanne [2004] ).  Broner, 
Lorenzoni, and Schmukler (2004) argue that emerging economies borrow short term due to the high risk premium 
charged by international capital markets on long-term debt (see also Schmukler and Vesperoni [2006]).  
However, unlike ours, none of them discussed interactions between debt maturity and foreign reserves that 
prevailed in emerging markets in the late 1990s and the early 2000s. 
The paper proceeds as follows.   Section 2 sets up our small open economy model and section 3 discusses its 
implications under constant foreign reserves.  Section 4 discusses macroeconomic consequences when the 
government chooses foreign reserves so as to minimize its loss function and section 5 presents the simulation 
results.  Section 6 shows some supporting evidence in East Asia and section 7 considers an implication for the 
US current account deficits.  Section 8 discusses implications for real exchange rates.  Section 9 summarizes   4 
our main results and refers to their implications. 
 
 
2.  A Small Open Economy Model 
  The main purpose of our theoretical model is to investigate macroeconomic consequences when the economy 
suddenly increased its aversion to liquidity risk.  We consider a small open economy that produces two 
composite goods, tradables and nontradables.    For analytical simplicity, we assume that outputs of tradables and 
nontradables, y
T and y
N, are fixed and constant overtime.  Each representative agent in the economy maximizes 
the following utility function: 
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illiquid debt, and Rt = foreign reserve.  The parameter β is a discount factor such that 0 < β < 1.  Subscript t 











the disutility function C (λb
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t+j, Rt+j) is strictly increasing and strictly convex in b
A
t+j. 
The budget constraint of the representative agent is 
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where Tt is lump-sum tax, p
N
t is the price of nontradable good, rA is real interest rate of liquid debt, and rB is real 
interest rate of illiquid debt.  For simplicity, we assume that rA < rB = (1/β) – 1.  The assumption that rA < rB 
reflects a liquidity premium that makes real interest rate of liquidity debt lower than that of illiquid debt.  Since 
the numeraire is the traded good, the real interest rates and the price of nontradable good are defined in terms of 
tradables. 
    A key feature in equation (1) is that net liquid debt and foreign reserve are in the utility  function.  In  our  model, 
net supply of domestic debt is always zero, so that b
A
t denotes net liquid foreign debt.  We assume that relative 
size of net liquid foreign debt to foreign reserve reduces the utility.    This is one of the simplest forms that capture 
potential costs from holding liquid foreign debts.  Panics in financial markets and sudden reversals in capital 
flows are more likely to happen when the country has higher (net) levels of liquid foreign debts but are less likely 




t+j) > 0 and ∂C (λb
A
t+j, 
Rt+j)/ ∂Rt+j < 0, the function C (λb
A
t+j, Rt+j) is a reduced form that captures the disutility from such potential costs. 
One may interpret the function C (λb
A
t+j, Rt+j) as a shopping time model where either a decline of b
A
t or a rise of 
Rt saves labor time for reducing liquidity risk.    In a closed economy, a fiat money provides such liquidity services 
in the money-in-the-utility function model.  In a small open economy that has a potential liquidity risk, either a 
decrease of liquid foreign debt or an increase of foreign reserve provides a similar service.  In the following   5 





t+j)∂Rt+j < 0.  The assumption reflects the fact that a foreign 
reserve accumulation relieves the marginal disutility from increased liquid foreign debt.  The parameter λ 
represents the degree of risk aversion to potential liquidity shocks.  An increased aversion to liquidity risk 
generally increases the marginal disutility from the increased liquid foreign debt. 
    The first-order conditions are derived by maximizing the following Lagrangian: 
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It holds that c
N
t = y
N in equilibrium.    Assuming interior solutions, the first-order conditions thus lead to 
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Since the numeraire is the traded good, the price of nontradable good p
N
t denotes the real exchange rate of this 
small open economy at time t, where a decline of p
N
t means depreciation of the real exchange rate.    Equation (4a) 
thus implies that the real exchange rate depreciates when c
T
t declines.  Equation (4b) determines the amount of 
consumption of tradable good.  Equation (4c) implies that the amount of liquid foreign debt b
A
t is inversely 
related with the amount of foreign reserves Rt.  This is because foreign reserves, which reduce liquidity risk, 
allow the representative agent to hold more liquid foreign debt. 
Under the assumption that rB = (1/β) – 1 where the real interest rate of illiquid debt is equal to the rate of time 











t are constant over time without unanticipated external shocks.
1  However, an 
unanticipated change of the parameter λ affects the equilibrium values of these variables.  In particular, the 
parameter λ affects the choice between liquid and illiquid foreign debts because of potential costs from holding 
liquid foreign debt and may affect the current account of the economy.     
 
 
3.  The Macroeconomic Impacts under Constant Foreign Reserves 
The main purpose of the following analysis is to explore the impacts when the economy suddenly increased its 
aversion to liquidity risk.  To achieve this goal, we explore what impacts an unanticipated change of λ has on 
                                                       
1 When  rB ≠ (1/β) – 1, Lagrangian multiplier μ t changes over time and consequently some macro variables such 
as c
T
t have a time trend.    However, even when rB ≠ (1/β) – 1, a basic message in the following analysis is 
essentially the same.   6 
various macroeconomic variables.    This section first considers the case where the amounts of foreign reserves Rt 
and lump-sum tax Tt are exogenously given and remain constant over time.  Under the balanced budget, the 
government issues no bond to finance its activity.  This corresponds to the case where only private individuals 
respond to an unanticipated increase of disutility from liquidity risk. 




t instantaneously jump 
to the new steady state at period τ, while both b
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N, the budget constraint thus leads to 
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where the variables with subscript 0 are those in the old steady state and the variables with subscript 1 are those in 
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Since equations (4b) and (4c) respectively imply that 
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 t denote net liquid foreign debt and net illiquid foreign 
debt respectively.    Equations (8a) and (8b) thus imply that the unanticipated decline of λ thus decreases not only 
the amount of net foreign liquidity debt but also the sum of net foreign liquidity and illiquidity debts.    Since the   7 
economy’s current account balance over period t is defined by   
 








 t+1)] + (Rt+1 - Rt), 
 
they also indicate that an unanticipated decline of λ improves the current account at period t because Rt is 
constant over time.    However, since Δ(b
A
 + b
B) = [(rB-rA)/ (1+rB)] Δb
A, the change of b
A + b
B is much smaller 
than the change of b
A because (rB-rA)/ (1+rB) is small.  This implies that the increased aversion may have a 
limited impact on the sum of net foreign debts, although it changes the component of net foreign debts 
substantially through decreasing liquid foreign debt and increasing illiquid debt when private individuals increase 
disutility from liquidity risk.     
The inequality (8a) implies that Δc
T /Δλ > 0.    Since Δμ/Δλ < 0, equation (4a) leads that Δp
N /Δλ < 0.    These 
inequalities imply that an unanticipated increase in the aversion decreases consumption of tradable good and leads 
to the depreciation of the real exchange rate.    Since rB > rA, the shift from liquidity debt to illiquid debt increases 
the burden of total interest payments.  Given consumption of non-tradable good, this decreases both c
T and p
N.  
However, to the extent that the sum of liquid and illiquid debts does not change much, its macroeconomic impacts 
are not large, causing only small current account surpluses. 
 
 
4.  The Government Loss Minimization Problem 
In the last section, we assumed that the amount of foreign reserves is exogenously given.  This exercise is 
useful to see macroeconomic consequences when only private individuals respond to an unanticipated increase in 
the aversion to liquidity risk.  It is, however, natural that the government also chooses the amount of foreign 
reserves so as to minimize the social costs.  The purpose of this section is to explore what impacts an 
unanticipated change of liquidity risk aversion has on various macroeconomic variables, especially the current 
account balance, when both private individuals and the government respond to an unanticipated increase in the 
disutility from liquidity risk.  In the analysis, we assume that the government minimizes the following loss 
function: 
 













t+j, Rt+j) is strictly decreasing and strictly convex in Rt+j.  This reflects the fact that foreign 
reserves relieve the country’s liquidity risk.  The parameter λ
G represents the degree of the government’s 







t+j) > 0.    An increased aversion to the risk 













t+j, Rt+j) is generally different from that of the   8 
representative private agent C (λb
A
t+j, Rt+j).   
  When increasing the amount of foreign reserves, the government has alternative methods to finance it.  
However, because of the Ricardian equivalence, the government method of finance does not affect resource 
allocation.  We thus focus on the case where the increases of the foreign reserves are solely financed by 
lump-sum tax increases.    In this case, the government budget constraint at period t is written as 
 
(11)  Tt = G* + Rt+1 – (1+r) Rt, 
 
where G* is exogenous government expenditure and r is real interest rate of the foreign reserves.  We assume 
that the rate of returns from foreign reserves is very low in international capital market so that r < rA < rB.  
Assuming interior solution, the government’s first-order conditions that minimizes (10) lead to 
 




t+1, Rt+1)/ ∂ Rt+1 = 0, 
 
Equation (12) means that the government changes the amount of foreign reserves up to the satiation point.  
Equations (11) and (12) together with equations (4a)-(4c) and (5a)-(5c) determines the equilibrium allocation 
when the government chooses the amount of foreign reserves so as to minimize the loss function. 




t are net foreign debts, the sum of which is still 
constant without external shocks even when the government chooses the amount of foreign reserves 
endogenously.  However, unanticipated changes of λ and λ
G affect the equilibrium allocation.  Suppose that 
there were unanticipated increases of λ and λ
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τ +1.    Since c
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t = y
N, the budget constraints in periods τ-1, τ, and τ+1 respectively lead to 
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where the variables with subscript 0 are those in the old steady state and the variables with subscript 1 are those in 
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T = [(rB-rA)/ (1+rB)] Δb
A- [(rB-r)/ (1+rB)] ΔR. 
 
The condition (14) degenerates into the condition (6) when ΔR = 0.  However, sinceΔR  ≠ 0 when the 
government optimally chooses R, the following results become very different from those in the last section. 
When the government chooses the amount of foreign reserves endogenously, equation (4c) implies   
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where Ω, which is positive, was defined below equations (8a) – (8c). 
  As you see in (17a), ΔR/Δλ depends on various derivatives and parameters.  Therefore, we cannot conclude 
that ΔR/Δλ is positive in general.  However, to the extent that the government chooses the amount of foreign 
reserves to minimize the liquidity risk, it is natural to suppose that the government increases R when aversion to 
liquidity risk increases.    We thus focus on the case where ΔR/Δλ > 0 in the following analysis.    When ΔR/Δλ > 
0, equation (17b) implies that Δb
A/Δλ depends on two opposite effects.  One is (-1/Ω) [∂C/∂(λb





 2] that is negative, reflecting the private agent’s responses to the increased aversion to liquidity risk.  
The other is (-λ/Ω)[∂
2C
G/∂(λb
A)∂R](ΔR/Δλ) that is positive, reflecting the government’s responses to the increased 
aversion to liquidity risk.    The sign of Δb
A/Δλ generally depends on which effect is bigger. 
 Given Δb









T/Δλ, and Δμ/Δλ in general depend on whether (rB-r) ΔR is bigger than (rB-rA) Δb
A or 
not.  Since the current account balance over period t is still defined by (9), this indicates that the effect on the 
current account is not clear.    However, when Δb




and  Δμ/Δλ.  In this case, the macroeconomic impacts of an unanticipated change of λ work in the same   10 
directions as those in the last section even if both the government and private individuals increase disutility from 
liquidity risk.   
Moreover, to the extent that (rB-r) ΔR > (rB-rA) Δb
A, the conditions (17c) and (17d) imply that an unanticipated 
increase of λ leads to a temporal improvement of the current account when the economy moves from the old 
steady state to the new steady state and that the increase of λ reduces the amount of tradable consumption and 
leads to the depreciation of the real exchange rate.    When the government increases foreign reserves substantially, 
the representative private agent may not need to increase costly illiquid foreign debt.    However, since the rate of 
returns from foreign reserves is very low, the private agent’s disposal income declines through increasing 
lump-sum tax.  Given consumption of non-tradable good, this may decrease both c
T and p
N and derives a 
temporal improvement of the current account. 
It is noteworthy that in terms of the magnitude, an unanticipated change of λ generally has different 
macroeconomic impacts when both the government and private individuals increase liquidity risk aversion from 
those when only private individuals do.  For example, suppose that two types of economies initially have a 
common value of Ω.    This happens when two types of economies initially have common values of b
A, R, and c
T.  
In this case, it is easy to see that the absolute value of Δb
A/Δλ is larger when only private individuals increase 
liquidity risk aversion.  However, even in this case, Δ(b
A
 + b
B - R)/Δλ and Δc
T/Δλ can be larger when both the 
government and private individuals increase liquidity risk aversion because of the effect of ΔR/Δλ.  In other 
words, an increased aversion to liquidity risk may lead to larger current account surplus in the short-run and may 
lower social welfare when the government minimizes the costs from liquidity risk and increases the amount of 




5.  Some numerical examples 
In the last section, we explored what impacts an increased aversion to liquidity risk have on current account and 
other macro variables when the government minimizes the costs from liquidity risk.  However, it is not 
necessarily clear the magnitude of the impacts without using specific functional forms.  The purpose of this 
section is to explore the quantitative impacts by specifying the functional forms in the model. 
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In (18a), the utility from consumption represents the case where an elasticity of substitution in consumption   11 
between the tradable good and the nontradable good equals to one.  The disutility functions (18b) and (18c) 
imply that the satiation ratio of b
A
t/Rt is D/λ for the private agent and D
G/λ
G for the government.     
To explore the impacts of unanticipated changes of λ and λ
G, we set the structural parameters as α = 0.7, β = 
0.9, γ =10, rB-rA = 0.05, r = 0.01, G* = 1.5, D = 1.05, and D
G = 1 and domestic outputs as y
T = y
N = 10.    We also 
see that R = 15 when the government does not choose R  endogenously.  These  parameters and variables remain 
constant throughout the period.  However, at period τ, there was an unanticipated preference shock in holding 
liquid foreign debt and the value of λ and λ








before period τ, the equilibrium values of macro variables are summarized in Table 2. 
In the table, Table 2-(1) reports the case where the government does not respond to the shock, while Table 2-(2) 









t in Table 2-(1).    In contrast, in Table 2-(2), the changes of λ and λ
G increase Rt substantially 








t -Rt.    As we discussed in the last section, it is not clear in general 
what impacts the changes of λ and λ
G have when both private individuals and the government respond to the 
shock.  However, Table 2-(2) indicates that under the parameter set and exogenous variables specified above, 
rises of λ and λ












t at period τ, and lead to a 
temporal current account surplus at period τ.  We can also see that the changes of these macro variables are 
substantial in Table 2-(2).    For example, tradable good consumption declines at period τ only by less than 1% in 




t -Rt in Table 2-(2) implies that the 
economy runs larger substantial current account surplus when the government also responds to the shock than 
when only the private individuals respond.     




t shows a dramatic change even when only private individuals respond to the shock.   
That is, b
A
t declined by about 10% and b
B
t increases by about 20% in Table 2-(1).    This reflects the fact that the 
increased aversion to liquidity risk causes a shift from liquid debt to illiquid debt when private individuals try to 




t also show significant changes in the 




t increase in Table 2-(2).  It is not clear in general whether the increased 
liquidity aversion increases b
A
t or not when both private individuals and the government respond to the shock.  
But if the government increases Rt and reduced the liquidity risk, the private individuals would have less incentive 
to shift their debts from liquid ones to illiquid ones.  Table 2-(2) shows that this effect can dominate the other 
under some reasonable parameter set.   




t may have interesting implications when the private individuals respond to 
the shock first and then the government follows it.    In this case, the increased liquidity aversion would have very 
different impacts depending on before or after the government responds.    Table 2-(3) summarizes the changes of 
macro variables under the circumstance.  In Table 2-(3), we still assume the parameter set and exogenous 
variables specified above.    But we suppose that before period 1, the economy was in the steady state where only 
private individuals maximized.    At period 1, there was an unanticipated shock and the value of λ increased from 
1 to 1.1 permanently.  At period 1, only private individuals respond to the shock, while the government keeps 
foreign reserves constant.  The changes of the variables from period 0 to period 1 are thus exactly the same as   12 
those in Table 2-(1).    However, after period 2, λ
G increased from 1 to 1.1 permanently and the government also 
starts to respond to the shock so as to minimize the loss function.  The steady state values are thus adjusted to 
those in Table 2-(2). 
  It is noteworthy that the introduction of the government’s minimization reduces the amount of tradable good 
consumption from 8.32 to 6.36 in Table 2-(3).  This implies that the welfare of the representative agent is not 
necessarily enhanced by the government’s optimization.    In fact, when λ = λ
 G = 1 permanently, we can confirm 
that the introduction of the government’s optimization reduces the lifetime utility of the representative agent from 
10.4 to 9.9.  This is partly because the government’s loss function is different from that of the private agent.  
However, low real interest of foreign reserves is another crucial factor that reduces the welfare of the 
representative agent.  The accumulation of foreign reserves is useful in reducing the liquidity risk for the 
representative agent.  However, since the accumulation of foreign reserves reduces available resource, it may 
deteriorate the welfare of the representative agent through reducing consumption of tradable goods. 
 
 
6. Some Evidence in East Asia 
After the Asian crisis, most Asian economies came to recognize that economic growth that relies on liquid 
external borrowings is not desirable, given their vulnerability to a sudden reversal of capital flows.    Soon after the 
crisis, they thus started to increase liquidity as an important self-protection against crises.    Our theoretical model, 
however, implies that they had alternative strategies for the self-protection depending on whether the government 
cares about liquidity risk or not. 
Based on the data in BIS Quarterly Review, Figure 2 reports the changes of short-term, medium-term, and 
long-term borrowings in seven East Asian economies before and after the crisis.  Reflecting dramatic capital 
inflows into East Asia before the crisis, we can observe large increases of all types of debts in 1995 and 1996.  
We can also observe that there were substantial declines of short-term borrowings not only during the crisis but for 
some periods after the crisis.   The declines of short-term borrowings during the crisis clearly happened because 
of capital flight under the panicking crisis.    It is, however, noteworthy that the declines of short-term borrowings 
continued even in 1998 when East Asian economies started their economic recovery.  At the same time, there 
were dramatic increases of medium-term borrowings and some increases of long-term borrowings in several East 
Asian economies after the crisis.     
These results indicate that many East Asian economies shifted their borrowings from liquid short-term debt to 
illiquid long-term debts soon after the crisis.    However, the shift from liquid debt to illiquid debt did not persist.   
Instead, liquid short-term debt increased again in the early 2000s.  Korea was the only East Asian country that 
had significant increases of short-term borrowings since the late 1990s.  But several East Asian economies also 
experienced increases of their short-term borrowings in the early 2000s.    In contrast, in the East Asian economies, 
medium-term debts and long-term debts slowed down their growth and sometimes declined during the same 
period.  This indicates that many East Asian economies might have reversed their maturity structures shifting 
their borrowings from illiquid long-term debt to liquid short-term debt.   13 
An essentially similar result can be obtained from the alternative data set in Global Development Finance 
issued by the World Bank.   Table 3 summarizes average maturities of private credits to six East Asian countries 
from 1995 to 2004.  In the East Asian countries, the average maturity increased during the crisis and remained 
high until the late 1999.  This indicates significant shifts from liquid short-term debt to illiquid long-term debt 
soon after the crisis.    However, as in Figure 2, Korea reduced the average maturity in the late 1990s.    The other 
East Asian countries also gradually reduced the maturity in the early 2000s.  This alternative data set also 
supports the view that many East Asian economies might have reversed their maturity structures in the early 
2000s. 
Since short-term borrowing is liquid debt and medium-term and long-term borrowings are illiquid debts, 
shifting their debt from short-term to long-term is consistent with the case where only private agents responded to 
the increased aversion to liquidity risk in our theoretical model.  In contrast, increasing their short-term 
borrowings and decreasing long-term borrowings are consistent with the case where the government also 
responded in the model.    The above evidence suggests that in East Asia, the former case prevailed soon after the 
crisis but the latter became dominant in the early 2000s. 
Among the strategies for the self-protection, replacing liquid short-term debt by illiquid long-term debt was one 
of the most popular advices that many economists suggested for developing countries.  However, what most 
Asian economies eventually took was raising foreign reserves.  Table 4 reports the ratios of foreign exchange 
reserves to GDP for ten East Asian economies (Japan, China, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, the 
Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Taiwan) from 1990 to 2004.    It shows that the ratios went up substantially 
after the crisis and showed further increases in the early 2000s except for Indonesia.  The ratios are now over 
10% in all East Asian economies and over 20% except for Japan, Indonesia, and the Philippines.  It is highly 
possible that the accumulated foreign reserves discouraged the private agents to replace liquid short-term debt by 
illiquid long-term debt in these economies. 
One may argue that the rapid rise in reserves in recent years has little to do with the self-insurance motive, but is 
instead related to policymakers’ desire to prevent the appreciation of their currencies and maintain the 
competitiveness of their tradable sectors.  The aggressive intervention could maintain the competitiveness of 
their tradable sectors and manifest itself in the massive accumulation of foreign reserves by Asian central banks.   
The argument may be relevant in explaining China’s reserve accumulation, where de facto dollar peg had been 
maintained for a long time.  To some extent, it may also explain recent reserve accumulation in the other East 
Asian economies.    However, it may not explain why the dramatic rise in foreign reserves started to happen after 
the crisis because the policymakers had an incentive to maintain the trade competitiveness even before the crisis.     
 
 
7.  An Implication for the US Current Account Deficits 
In previous sections, we provided some theoretical and empirical analyses on the changes in international 
capital flows in East Asian economies after the currency crisis in 1997.  The analyses were motivated by what 
happened in East Asia after the crisis.    However, the changes of capital flows in East Asia would have a special   14 
implication for the U.S. current account when the government  accumulates  foreign  reserves.  This  is  because  the 
U.S. dollar is the dominant reserve currency in international capital market, so that it became indispensable for 
developing countries to accumulate the U.S. government bonds that would make crises less likely.   
Unfortunately, each government keeps the currency composition of the foreign exchange reserves a 
well-guarded secret.   But IMF annual report provides average currency composition for industrialized countries 
and developing countries every year.  In addition, Tavlas and Ozeki (1991) reported average currency 
composition for selected Asian countries in the 1980s.
2  Table 5 summarizes the reported currency compositions.   
The shares of the U.S. dollar have been high in both industrialized and developing countries.  In particular, the 
shares of the U.S. dollar in developing countries were close to 70% from 1991 to 2001.    Although updated data 
is not available for the selected Asian countries, more than half of these reserves are likely to have been invested in 
the United Sates, typically U.S. treasuries or other safe U.S. safe assets.     
Some comparable data sets are also available from the U.S. side.  The U.S. Treasury does have estimates of 
major foreign holders of treasury securities holdings from 2000 to 2005.  Table 6 summarizes the estimates for 
Japan, China, Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Singapore, and  Thailand.  The  changes  of  treasury securities holdings 
were modest in Hong Kong, Singapore, and Thailand.  However, there were dramatic increases of treasury 
securities holdings in China and Japan.  In Korea and Taiwan, the amount of treasury securities holdings was 
more than doubled from 2000 to 2005.    Although the data includes both official and private holdings, it is more 
likely that recent increases in central bank reserves account for a large share of those assets.
3  The  reserves,  which 
are typically held in the form of U.S. Treasury bills and agency bonds, pay a low rate of return.  It is less likely 
that private investors accumulated such assets of low interest rates. 
The evidence supports the view that substantial rises in foreign exchange reserves increase capital inflows into 
the United States.  It is, however, noteworthy that similar capital inflows from East Asia would not happen 
outside the United States when the East Asian economies adopt the strategy of replacing liquid short-term debt by 
illiquid long-term debt for the self-protection.  In fact, several East Asian economies came to run frequent trade 
balance deficits against the other countries in the early 2000s.  For example, Korea’s trade balance against 
non-U.S. countries was in deficit in 2001 and 2002.  China and Thailand have run deficit against non-U.S. 
countries since 2000.  The change of the strategies from the late 1990s to the early 2000s may explain why the 
East Asian economies widened their trade account surpluses only against the United States in the 2000s. 
Needless to say, our results do not necessarily deny alternative views in explaining recent increases in the U.S. 
current account deficits.  One may argue that the recent deterioration in the U.S. current account primarily 
reflects economic policies and other economic developments within the United States itself.  One popular 
argument for the "made in the U.S.A." explanation of the rising current account deficit focuses on the burgeoning 
U.S. federal budget deficit.  That inadequate U.S. national saving is the source of declining national saving and 
                                                       
2  Tavlas and Ozeki (1991) did not clarify which countries they included in their selected Asian countries.    China 
is likely to be excluded in their estimates.   
3  When Treasuries are resold, it is difficult to identify who holds what U.S. Treasury securities.    Private custodial 
transactions on behalf of governments also cloud matters.     15 
the current account deficit must be true at some level.  However, the so-called twin-deficits hypothesis, that 
government budget deficits cause current account deficits, does not account for the fact that the U.S. external 
deficit expanded by about $300 billion between 1996 and 2000, a period during which the federal budget was in 
surplus and projected to remain so.  It seems unlikely, therefore, that changes in the U.S. government budget 
position can entirely explain the behavior of the U.S. current account over the past decade (see also Erceg, 
Guerrieri, and Gust (2005)).  The U.S. national saving is currently very low and falls considerably short of 
domestic capital investment.  Of necessity, this shortfall is made up by net foreign borrowing.  The increased 
capital flows from the East Asian economies to the U.S. economy may provide one of the promising answers to 
the question of why the United States has been borrowing so heavily in international capital markets. 
 
 
8.  Implications for Real Exchange Rates 
One of the byproducts in our theoretical analysis is the impacts of increased liquidity risk aversion on the real 
exchange rate.  If recent current account surpluses in East Asia primarily reflect either an increase in the U.S. 
demand for East Asian products or increased productivity of East Asian exports, they would naturally lead to 
currency appreciation of East Asian currencies in a world of floating exchange rates.  However, when the 
economy increases its liquidity risk aversion, large current account surpluses could persist for long years 
accompanied by the real exchange rate depreciation.    This is particularly true for current account surplus against 
the United States the currency of which has been widely held as an international reserve currency.    The purpose 
of this section is to investigate these implications empirically.   Figure 3 reports real exchange rates of eight East 
Asian economies from 1990 to 2004.  In the figure, lower values mean depreciation.  It shows that except for 
China, the real exchange rates depreciated substantially against the U.S. dollar after the crisis and remained low 
even after the economies recovered from the crisis.  The rate of depreciation from 1996 to 2004 is more than 
20% in Korea, Thailand, Malaysia, and the Philippines. 
The basic result still remains true even when we use absolute PPP data to evaluate the real exchange rates after 
the crisis.  By using the balanced panel data of the Penn World Table (PWT 6.2) from 1990 to 2003, we 
estimated the simple following logarithmic equation over the 2000 observations: 
 
(19)   log  Pj/PU.S. = constant + a⋅ log Yj/YU.S., 
 
where Pj/PU.S. is the price level of country j relative to the United States, and Yj/YU.S. is country j’s    relative income 
level to the United States.  We included log Yj/YU.S. in the regression because Rogoff (1996) found that the 
Balassa-Samuelson effect leads to a clear positive association between relative price levels and real incomes.     
  To examine the real exchange rate depreciation in East Asia after the crisis, we include the post-crisis dummy 
and the post-crisis East Asian dummy.  The post-crisis dummy is a time dummy that takes one from 1998 to 
2003 and zero otherwise.    The post-crisis East Asian dummy is an East Asian regional dummy times a post-crisis 
dummy that takes one from 1999 to 2003 only for eleven Asian economies (China, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Korea,   16 
Macao, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Taiwan, Thailand, and Vietnum) and zero otherwise.  We started 
the post-crisis East Asian dummy from 1999 because the East Asian economies might have had a different 
strategy for the self-protection in 1998.  Because China, former centrally planned countries, and post-crisis 
Indonesia can be outliers, we also include the China dummy, the East Europe dummy, and the post-crisis 
Indonesia dummy in some regressions.  The China dummy or the East Europe dummy takes one from 1990 to 
2003 for China or two East Europe countries (Romania and Russia) and zero otherwise.  The post-crisis 
Indonesia dummy takes one from 1998 to 2003 for Indonesia and zero otherwise. 
  Table 7 reports the results of our regressions with and without the three extra dummies.  Like the Rogoff’s 
result, the coefficient of the relative income level always takes significantly positive, showing a clear positive 
association between relative price levels and real incomes.  However, the coefficients of the two time dummy 
variables are significantly negative.  The negative coefficient of the post-crisis dummy implies that there was 
worldwide undervaluation of real exchange rates against the U.S. dollar after the crisis.    The negative coefficient 
of the post-crisis East Asian dummy implies that the degree of the undervaluation of the real exchange rates was 
more conspicuous among the East Asian economies after the Asian crisis.     
It is noteworthy that the negative coefficient of the post-crisis East Asian dummy is much larger than that of the 
post-crisis dummy in the absolute value.    The result is consistent with our theoretical model where the East Asian 
economies which increased the liquidity risk aversion had current account surpluses accompanied by the real 
exchange rate depreciation.  The result does not change even if we include the China dummy, the East Europe 
dummy, and the post-crisis Indonesia dummy.    All of the three dummies had significantly negative coefficients.
4  
However, both the post-crisis dummy and the post-crisis East Asian dummy kept having negative impacts, 
implying undervaluation outside the United States and larger undervaluation in East Asia after the crisis.     
 
 
9.  Concluding Remarks 
During the last decade, financial globalization has been accompanied by frequent and painful financial crises.  
Some of the well-known crises include Mexico in 1995, East Asia in 1997, Russia in 1998, Brazil in 1999, and 
Argentina in 2002.  During the crises, countries with smaller liquid foreign assets had hard time in preventing 
panics in financial markets and sudden reversals in capital flows.  Many developing countries thus came to 
recognize that increased liquidity is an important self-protection against crises.  However, developing countries 
have alternative strategies for the self-protection.  Replacing  liquid  short-term debt by illiquid long-term debt and 
raising foreign reserves are two popular strategies that many economists advised.  The first strategy would be 
taken when the private individuals respond to the shock because an increased aversion to liquidity risk among 
private individuals reduces liquid debt and increases illiquid debt.  We found that the East Asian economies 
might have taken it soon after the crisis.  However, we also found that what most Asian economies have taken 
                                                       
4  The negative coefficient of the China dummy implies that the Chinese Yuan had been undervalued throughout 
the 1990s.    It reconfirms the conclusion of Frankel (2005) that China’s prices have been well below the level that 
one would predict from the Balassa-Samuelson equation.   17 
seriously in the 2000s was the second strategy.  Under reasonable parameter set, it may lead to larger liquidity 
debt, smaller illiquid debt, and larger current account surpluses, accompanied by depreciation of the real exchange 
rate when the government responded to an unanticipated increase in the liquidity risk aversion.    Macroeconomic 
impacts of the increased liquidity risk aversion can be very different depending on which strategy developing 
countries will take.     
When looking at recent remarkable reversal in global capital flows, East Asian economies have been one of the 
major net lenders after the currency crisis in 1997.    Foreign exchange reserves held by East Asian economies are 
now record-breaking, and stand at levels that are a multiple of those held by advanced countries.  In particular, 
because of the role of the U.S. dollar as an international currency, it became indispensable for developing countries 
to accumulate the U.S. government bonds that would make crises less likely.   Consequently, after the crisis, the 
increased preference for international liquidity allowed a large proportion of the U.S. current account deficit to be 
financed by developing countries, especially East Asian economies.  It is important to reconsider what impacts 
the increased liquidity risk aversion in East Asia had on international capital flows, including the U.S. current 
account deficit.     
Needless to say, our model is too simple to describe a variety of macroeconomic phenomena in East Asia after 
the crisis.  For example, our model neglected the role of capital stock investment which showed dramatic 
fluctuations before and after the crisis.  It also did not take into account risk premium for long-term debt that 
prevailed in emerging markets.    Incorporating these factors would be left for our future research.   18 
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Table 1. Trade Balances of East Asian Economies 
 
Unit = billions of U.S. dollar
China Korea Singapore Hong Kong
Total U.S.A. Non-U.S. Total U.S.A. Non-U.S. Total U.S.A. Non-U.S. Total U.S.A. Non-U.S.
1995 16.8 8.6 8.2 -9.8 -6.2 -3.6 -6.2 2.9 -9.1 -19.2 23.0 -42.2
1996 12.1 10.6 1.6 -19.8 -11.5 -8.3 -6.6 1.5 -8.1 -18.0 22.7 -40.7
1997 40.8 16.5 24.3 -8.4 -8.4 0.0 -7.2 0.7 -8.0 -20.8 24.7 -45.5
1998 43.4 21.0 22.4 39.3 2.7 36.7 8.3 3.1 5.2 -10.9 26.9 -37.8
1999 29.2 22.5 6.7 23.9 4.7 19.3 3.7 3.0 0.6 -5.9 28.8 -34.6
2000 24.0 29.8 -5.8 11.3 8.5 2.8 3.3 3.6 -0.3 -11.3 32.6 -43.9
2001 23.1 28.2 -5.0 8.7 8.9 -0.2 5.7 -0.4 6.1 -11.6 28.9 -40.6
2002 30.3 42.8 -12.5 9.4 9.8 -0.5 8.6 2.5 6.1 -7.8 31.1 -38.8
2003 25.4 58.7 -33.3 13.9 9.4 4.5 16.1 2.6 13.6 -8.7 29.0 -37.7
2004 31.8 80.4 -48.6 28.7 14.1 14.6 16.5 2.5 14.0 -12.1 29.5 -41.6
Thailand Indonesia Malaysia Philippines
Total U.S.A. Non-U.S. Total U.S.A. Non-U.S. Total U.S.A. Non-U.S. Total U.S.A. Non-U.S.
1995 -16.5 1.6 -18.1 3.8 1.9 1.9 -3.9 2.7 -6.5 -10.9 1.0 -11.9
1996 -17.6 0.8 -18.4 7.0 1.7 5.2 -0.2 2.1 -2.3 -11.2 0.7 -11.9
1997 -5.4 2.5 -7.8 9.2 2.0 7.1 -1.5 1.3 -2.9 -19.9 1.6 -21.6
1998 11.4 6.1 5.3 21.5 3.5 18.0 15.2 4.4 10.7 0.0 3.6 -3.6
1999 8.1 6.2 1.9 24.7 4.1 20.6 19.1 7.1 11.9 4.7 4.1 0.6
2000 7.0 7.4 -0.4 28.6 5.1 23.5 16.0 6.5 9.5 3.7 5.0 -1.3
2001 3.1 6.0 -3.0 25.3 4.6 20.8 14.8 6.0 8.9 -0.9 2.6 -3.5
2002 4.1 7.3 -3.2 25.9 4.9 20.9 13.9 5.7 8.2 -0.2 1.4 -1.6
2003 4.5 6.5 -2.0 28.5 4.7 23.8 22.2 7.7 14.6 -1.3 -0.1 -1.1
2004 2.1 8.2 -6.2 25.0 5.6 19.5 22.2 8.5 13.7 -4.4 -1.1 -3.3  
 
Source) IMF, Direction of Trade Statistics Yearbook, various issues.   21 
Table 2.    The Impacts of an Increase in λ: Numerical Examples 
 








period τ-1 15.00 16.38 7.01 23.39 0.00 8.39 1.80
period τ 15.00 16.38 7.01 23.39 0.07 8.32 1.78
period τ+1 15.00 14.84 8.48 23.32 0.00 8.32 1.78








period τ-1 14.86 15.60 6.26 21.86 0.00 7.00 9.85
period τ 14.86 15.60 6.26 21.86 0.64 6.36 9.55
period τ+1 26.77 25.56 7.58 33.14 0.00 6.36 9.55








period 0 15.00 16.38 7.01 23.39 0.00 8.39 1.80
period 1 15.00 16.38 7.01 23.39 0.07 8.32 1.78
period 2 15.00 14.84 8.48 23.32 1.95 6.36 9.55
period 3 26.77 25.56 7.58 33.14 0.00 6.36 9.55    22 
Table 3.    Average Maturity of New Commitments in Private Credit to East Asia 
 
Unit = years
China Indonesia Korea Malaysia PhilippinesThailand
1995 7.3 11.0 5.8 16.9 10.9 8.9
1996 7.0 11.5 12.3 18.1 13.9 7.9
1997 6.4 16.1 6.6 12.7 14.4 10.9
1998 11.1 n.a. 6.4 13.7 6.3 6.8
1999 10.9 14.3 5.1 10.3 13.5 8.8
2000 10.5 6.9 4.6 7.6 11.4 7.3
2001 10.2 8.0 4.1 11.6 4.7 5.9
2002 10.1 9.4 . 10.2 9.4 4.3
2003 8.7 7.9 . 6.1 8.3 4.7
2004 9.0 8.2 . 8.3 8.5 5.0  
 
Source) Global Development Finance, The World Bank.   23 
Table 4. The Ratios of Foreign Exchange Reserves to GDP in East Asia 
 
Japan China Hong Kong Indonesia Korea
1990 2.7 9.7 32.8 7.0 5.8
1991 2.2 12.6 33.5 8.0 4.7
1992 2.0 5.6 35.0 8.3 5.6
1993 2.3 5.5 36.4 7.1 5.6
1994 2.6 9.8 37.0 6.9 6.1
1995 3.5 10.8 39.1 6.8 6.3
1996 4.6 13.0 40.8 8.0 6.1
1997 5.1 15.8 53.4 7.7 3.9
1998 5.5 15.6 54.2 23.8 15.0
1999 6.4 15.8 59.9 18.9 16.6
2000 7.5 15.6 65.1 17.3 18.8
2001 9.5 18.1 68.3 16.6 21.3
2002 11.6 22.3 69.9 15.5 22.2
2003 15.4 27.8 76.3 14.7 25.5
2004 17.9 37.3 75.8 13.6 29.3
Malaysia Philippines Singapore Thailand Taiwan
1990 22.8 2.1 76.0 15.6 45.2
1991 23.1 7.2 80.7 17.8 45.9
1992 29.9 8.3 82.2 18.3 38.8
1993 40.7 8.6 82.9 19.6 37.3
1994 34.1 9.4 82.4 20.3 37.8
1995 26.8 8.6 81.8 21.4 34.1
1996 26.8 12.1 83.4 20.7 31.5
1997 20.8 8.9 74.7 17.3 28.8
1998 35.4 14.2 91.3 25.8 33.8
1999 38.6 17.4 93.1 27.8 36.9
2000 32.7 17.2 86.6 26.1 34.4
2001 34.6 18.9 87.8 28.0 43.7
2002 36.0 17.7 92.7 30.0 57.4
2003 42.9 17.6 103.7 28.7 72.2
2004 56.4 15.5 105.1 29.8 79.2  
 
Sources) Except for Taiwan, International Financial Statistics, IMF.    For Taiwan, Key Indicators, ADB.   24 
Table 5. Official Holdings of Foreign Exchange 
 
(%)
1980 1984 1989 1994 1999 2004
U.S. dollar
Industrial countries 54.3 57.0 48.4 51.2 73.5 71.5
Developing countries 58.1 57.0 60.5 61.8 68.2 59.9
Selected Asian countries 48.6 58.2 56.4 n.a. n.a. n.a.
Japanese yen
Industrial countries 2.1 5.3 7.5 8.3 6.7 3.6
Developing countries 4.9 4.1 6.9 8.2 6.0 4.3
Selected Asian countries 13.9 16.3 17.5 n.a. n.a. n.a.
Pound sterling
Industrial countries 0.5 1.4 1.2 2.3 2.2 1.9
Developing countries 5.3 4.1 5.8 4.9 3.7 4.8
Selected Asian countries 3.0 3.5 6.4 n.a. n.a. n.a.
Deutsche mark
Industrial countries 9.4 12.9 20.6 16.4 - -
Developing countries 15.4 8.8 11.7 11.8 - -
Selected Asian countries 20.6 14.6 15.2 n.a. - -
ECUs or Euro
Industrial countries 29.0 20.6 15.0 14.1 16.1 20.9
Developing countries 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 19.9 29.2
Selected Asian countries 0.0 0.0 0.0 n.a. n.a. n.a.
Swiss franc
Industrial countries 1.1 1.2 1.1 0.2 0.1 0.1
Developing countries 4.8 2.6 2.2 2.0 0.4 0.2
Selected Asian countries 10.6 4.9 3.0 n.a. n.a. n.a.
French franc
Industrial countries 0.0 0.4 1.1 2.1 - -
Developing countries 2.6 1.7 2.1 2.1 - -
Selected Asian countries 0.6 0.6 0.5 n.a. - -
Netherlands guilder
Industrial countries 0.4 0.6 1.1 0.2 - -
Developing countries 1.3 0.9 1.0 0.9 - -
Selected Asian countries 2.8 1.9 0.9 n.a. - -
other currencies
Industrial countries 3.2 0.7 4.0 5.3 1.4 2.0
Developing countries 7.6 20.8 9.9 8.3 1.7 1.6
Selected Asian countries 0.0 0.0 0.0 n.a. n.a. n.a.  
 
Sources)  Except for selected Asian countries, IMF annual report.  For selected Asian countries, Tavlas and 
Ozeki (1991).   25 
Table 6. Major Foreign Holders of U.S. Treasury Securities 
 
billions of dollars
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Japan 317.7 317.9 378.1 550.8 689.9 671
China 60.3 78.6 118.4 159 222.9 310.9
Korea 29.6 32.8 38 63.1 55 68.9
Taiwan 33.4 35.3 37.4 50.9 67.9 68.1
Hong Kong 38.6 47.7 47.5 50 45.1 40.3
Singapore 27.9 20 17.8 21.2 30.4 33
Thailand 13.8 15.7 17.2 11.7 12.5 16.1
Source) http://www.ustreas.gov/tic/mfhhis01.txt.
Note) All data are those in the end of December..  
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constant -0.0996 -0.0881 -0.0889
(-5.66) (-5.07) (-5.13)
logYj/YU.S. 0.3420 0.3428 0.3423
(46.69) (47.49) (47.50)
post-crisis dummy -0.0991 -0.1007 -0.0976
(-5.60) (-5.78) (-5.60)
post-crisis East Asian dummy -0.3112 -0.2827 -0.2268
(-5.37) (-4.88) (-4.06)
China dummy -0.4125 -0.4179
(-3.70) (-3.74)
East Europe dummy -0.6340 -0.6352
(-8.14) (-8.18)
post-crisis Indonesia dummy -0.6101
(-3.48)
adj.R-squared 0.4898 0.5066 0.5102  
 
Notes  
1) Number of observations is 2338 (14 periods for 168 countries) for each regression.    Data period is from 1990 
to 2003 (balanced panel). 
2) Eleven Asia countries are: China, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Korea, Macao, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, 
Taiwan, Thailand, and Vietnam. 
3) t-statistics are in parentheses. 
4) Data source is the Penn World Table (PWT 6.2), where Yj = nominal GDP per capita in country j and Pj =price 
level of Yj.    The data was downloaded from http://pwt.econ.upenn.edu/.   27 












1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 Year
Billions of dollars
United States Japan Germany
 
 
Source) International Financial Statistics, IMF.   28 
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1) The data are percent changes of international claims from a year earlier in average amounts outstanding. 
2)    Short-term is up to and including one year, medium-term is 1 up to 2 years, and long-term is over 2 years. 
Source) Table 9A in BIS Quarterly Review (June 12, 2006).   30 










1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Year
Real Exchange Rate
China Korea Hong Kong Singapore
Thailand Malaysia Indonesia Philippines
 
 
Sources) International Financial Statistics, IMF。 
Notes 1) All real exchange rates are normalized to be 100 in 2000. 
     2)  “Real  Exchange  Rate” of country c in year y  ( ) [ ] y USA y y c p e e p , 2000 , 100 × × =  
where e = nominal exchange rate (dollar per national currency), p = except for China, Producer Price 
Index (for China, Consumer Price Index). 
     3)  Lower  values  mean  depreciation. 